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Abstract 
Galvanised by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, many jurisdictions now 
recognise children’s rights to participate in decisions that affect them. While such legal rights 
have increased, research on family law proceedings shows how children’s views can still be 
undermined, ignored or not even sought in decisions about them. This article uses the 
academic resources of childhood studies, to consider dominant and alternative narratives of 
children’s participation within Scottish family law. Drawing upon reported case law and 
empirical research, the article concludes that children’s participation gains protection by 
being institutionalised but children’s participation is attenuated because it is not recognised 
as relational and contextual. As rationality, consistency and autonomy are privileged, the 
weight given to children’s views is lessened by concerns about children being manipulated or 
distressed. Courts and their decisions may be child-focused, centring on children’s welfare, 
but they are not child-inclusive, involving children in decision-making.  
Keywords: family law; participation; views; children; manipulation; children’s rights 
 
Introduction  
In 2007, Hunter wrote about changing paradigms in family law: 
The welfare paradigm, which sees children as lacking the capacity and maturity to 
understand and assert their own needs, has been challenged by new paradigms, 
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including children’s rights, and children as social actors and young citizens. Within these 
new paradigms, children are no longer conceived as dependent, vulnerable, at-risk 
victims of divorce and passive objects of law, but are seen as subjects with agency. (p. 
283) 
This description mirrors very familiar ideas for childhood studies, an academic area that has sought 
to counter ‘traditional’ conceptualisations of children as passive, dependent and lesser than adults 
with conceptualisations of children as active social actors in their own lives as well as their families 
and communities (e.g. James, Jenks and Prout, 1998; Wyness, 2011). This is more than an 
intellectual exercise – how we (largely adults) perceive children and childhood impacts on our 
informal and formal practices. As Hunter writes in her article, if children are seen as lacking capacity 
and dependent, they will not be included in family law decisions. If they are seen as subjects with 
agency, their participation will be both recognised and facilitated.  
Yet, just when Hunter was describing changing paradigms in family law, so childhood studies was 
beginning to debate and question their characterisations of children’s agency, claims for children’s 
participation and assertions of children’s autonomy. While recognising the practical power of such 
discourses, aligned with the political agenda of children’s rights, these discourses fail to incorporate 
post-modern ideas about identity and subjectivity. These ideas recognise relations of power and 
knowledge, questioning whether anyone is an ‘autonomous agent’ and suggesting that all views are 
contingent, interpreted and contextually dependent (e.g. Gallacher and Gallagher, 2008). Perhaps 
even more salient are the practical disadvantages for children, of certain assertions about their 
agency, which leave some children even more vulnerable or marginalised (see below for discussion). 
With this questioning of agency, and how agency has been used within research and associated 
policy and practice, have come reassessments of children’s participation and how best to support 
children’s rights to participate.  
Wyness (2016) takes up such critiques of agency, for children’s participation more generally. He first 
identifies five dominant narratives in the literature:  
(1) as formalised, set within institutions;  
(2) event-based;  
(3) outcomes-oriented;  
(4) discursive, concentrating on words whether spoken or written; and 
(5) individualistic, concentrating on the individual child.  
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He then lists emerging, alternative narratives, three of which are relevant to this article.  First, rather 
than formalised or event-based, participation is perceived as embedded in children’s ‘everyday 
lives’, routine and on-going (e.g. see Percy-Smith, 2010). Second, participation can be understood as 
relational, enacted and created with others, rather than reifying the individual person with agency 
(e.g. Mannion, 2007; Punch and Tisdall, 2012). Third, participation can be perceived as emotional 
and embodied, rather than solely rational and intellectual (e.g. Jupp, 2008). Considering both the 
dominant and alternatives narratives, provides an illuminating critique of Scottish court practices in 
regards to children’s participation.  
This article continues a journey of analysing reported case law and empirical research, following the 
explicit efforts to strengthen children’s rights to participate in Scottish family law proceedings 
through the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. Children gained unprecedented rights to have their views 
duly considered by a court, in disputed cases of parental responsibilities and rights, along with a slew 
of mechanisms to support them. We first analysed early attempts at implementation, through a 
research project completed in 2001 (see Marshall, Tisdall, Cleland and Plumtree, 2002; Tisdall, Bray, 
Marshall and Cleland, 2004). We then returned for a re-assessment of reported case law up until 
2009 and the emerging findings from Morrison’s PhD project on children affected by domestic abuse 
and contact with their fathers, in the chapter Tisdall and Morrison (2012). This article capitalises on: 
the now completed PhD research by Morrison (2014), which was an indepth study with 18 children 
and 16 mothers; the breadth of Mackay’s PhD project (Mackay 2013a and b), who reviewed the 
court papers of 208 contact disputes, concerning 299 children, which were raised in two sheriff 
courts in 2007;1 and the scoping study on child contact proceedings for children affected by 
domestic abuse (Morrison, Tisdall, Jones, and Reid, 2013). The article incorporates key policy and 
practice developments over recent years: constraints on legal aid and the associated rise of self-
represented litigants; global interest in judicial interviewing (see Bala, Birnbaum and Cyr, 2015); and 
increased recognition of domestic abuse and its effects on children (Humphreys and Bradbury-Jones, 
2015). In order to explain why children’s participation is so often provisional or non-existent, 
Wyness’ narratives provide a fresh framework to analyse how Scottish family law proceedings deal 
with children’s participation – and identifies alternative ways of understanding participation that 
would better facilitate children’s ethical and meaningful involvement.  
                                                          
1 Further, Mackay sent questionnaires to the family law practitioners and then parents, who had been 
involved. Responses from parents were limited, with 28 responding, and a following eight parents and two 
children were interviewed. Additional interviews were done with family law practitioners, sheriffs and non-
legal practitioners. 
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This article draws together an analysis of the current state of children’s participation in Scottish 
family law with the debates within childhood studies. It first sketches the heritage of childhood 
studies and current discussions. It then briefly describes children’s participation rights in Scottish 
family law. The article goes on to consider how Wyness’ dominant narratives characterise much of 
Scottish family law. The article concludes by considering alternative narratives that illuminate how 
family law practices risk excluding children, by either not involving them or diminishing the weight 
given to their views.  
Children’s agency and participation  
Academics in the 1980s and 1990s began to develop an alternative conceptual and research agenda 
for children and childhood, distinguishing itself from the dominance of developmental psychology 
and functionalism in sociology (Mayall, 2012). In 1990, Prout and James sought to lay down some of 
the key elements of this new agenda. These included: 
 While childhood may have a material basis, how it is understood is socially constructed.  
 Children should be seen as active in the construction and determination of their own lives, 
the lives of those around them, and of the societies in which they live.  
Subsequently, a proliferation of micro-studies and writings has sought to evidence and argue that 
‘children are agents in their own lives’ (for critique, see Holloway and Pimlott-Wilson, 2011; James, 
2010).  
For those interested in practical applications, the research interest in children’s agency paralleled 
the recognition of children’s participation rights by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). The CRC was ratified by the UN General Assembly in 1989 and is the most ratified human 
rights convention – only the USA has currently not ratified it, of all States Parties. The CRC has a 
grouping of children’s participation rights, that include Article 13 (freedom of expression), Article 14 
(freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Article 15 (freedom of association and peaceful 
assembly) and Article 17 (access to information). Considered a key overarching principle of the CRC 
(UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2003), Article 12 states: 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
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2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard 
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the 
procedural rules of national law. 
It is particularly Article 12 that has garnered both research and policy attention and was highly 
influential in changing Scottish family law, as well as other jurisdictions (see European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 2015).  
Attention to children’s agency and their participation counter-balances the previous decades where 
children were the objects and subjects of research and services, but not included as valued 
contributors or co-creators. But this literature risks reifying certain constructions of childhood – 
which in turn have practical implications for children as well as conceptual problems. One problem is 
the positioning of children as agents or having agency. Some children live in such highly constrained 
contexts that they have great difficulty expressing agency (Ansell, 2009). Whilst the assertion of 
children’s agency has led to a greater inclusion of some children in research and potentially policy 
and practice, it paradoxically risks marginalising children (and others) who cannot achieve this 
agentic ideal of independence and autonomy (Holt, 2011; Ruddick, 2007; Tisdall, 2012). Rather than 
seeing agency as an essential identity, position or characteristic, childhood studies’ literature is 
increasingly suggesting that agency is relational and contextual (see Oswell, 2013; Tisdall and Punch, 
2012). Much of the research and associated literature on children ‘as agents’ is also problematic 
because of the normative value given to agency. Children’s agency is celebrated, as positively 
recognising children’s contributions as social actors. But then it becomes difficult to recognise, let 
alone include and consider, when children express agency in ways that go against the moral values 
and social order of the researcher and others. This can be tracked through the ambivalence in the 
literature on children who work (Hanson, Volonakis and Al-Rozzi, 2015), children involved in 
prostitution (Montgomery, 2007), and ‘child soldiers’ (Rosen, 2007). Coining the phrase ‘ambiguous 
agency’, Bordonaro and Payne (2012) write how children’s expressions of agency are diminished, 
ignored or categorised as something else, when such expressions challenge adults’ normative views.  
Thus, through a combination of policy and research interest, children’s agency and participation has 
gained increased prominence and some practical purchase in decisions that affect them. However, 
implementation remains problematic and increasingly childhood studies suggests that is partially 
because of the inadequate interrogation of these concepts and their use. Below, the legal basics of 
how children can participate in Scottish family law proceedings are outlined, before using Wyness’ 
dominant and alternative narratives to consider current practices.  
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Scottish family law: children’s participation in s.11 orders 
When courts are making decisions about parental responsibilities and rights, children’s welfare is the 
paramount consideration (Children (Scotland) Act 1995 S.11(7)(a)). Children’s views, though, have a 
role in such decisions. The court, when considering whether or not to make an order, must: 
… taking account of the child’s age and maturity, shall so far as practicable: 
i) give him the opportunity to indicate whether he wishes to express his views; 
ii) if he does so wish, give him an opportunity to express them; and 
iii) have regard to such views as he may express. (S.11(7)(b)) 
A child aged 12 or above shall be presumed to be of sufficient age and maturity to form a view 
(S.11(10)). Thus the legislation sets out the welfare principle as paramount, alongside step-by-step 
requirements to ensure a child’s view is given due regard within the court’s decision.  
Mechanisms seek to operationalise these provisions, including:  
 If children are served with papers once the case enters the court process (called 
‘intimation’), they receive a Form F9 requesting their views. The form goes back to the 
sheriff.2 
 The court may appoint a court reporter or curator ad litem to report on the child’s views.  
 The sheriff may express the wish to hear directly from the child and ask for the child to be 
brought to the court. 
 The child may give evidence as a witness, at a proof. A child can use ‘special measures’ to 
help the child give evidence, as a ‘vulnerable witness’ under S.11 of the Vulnerable 
Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004.  
 A child may take independent legal advice. If this were done, the child’s views can be 
expressed in several ways. The lawyer may help the child to fill in Form F9; the lawyer may 
write to the court on the child’s behalf; or the lawyer may seek to have the child involved as 
a party to the action.  
 Alternatively, the lawyer may appear on the child’s behalf at the Child Welfare Hearing to 
express the child’s views. The Child Welfare Hearing provides an early hearing to resolve any 
disputed issues in family actions, particularly in relation to children.3 
                                                          
2 At the time of writing, sheriff is a professional judge in the second tier of courts. A sheriff would hear most 
family law cases in the first instance – but some cases are heard in the Court of Session in the first instance.  
3 This list is largely taken from Tisdall and Morrison (2012), pages 158-159. 
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A child under the age of 16 has the legal capacity to instruct a lawyer in any civil matter, where the 
child has a general understanding of what it means to do so (Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 
1991, S.2(4A)); however, restrictions in legal aid introduced in 20114 curtail this possibility for most 
children, for S.11 proceedings.  
Thus, Scotland had a framework around court decisions on parental responsibilities and rights, which 
requires a child’s welfare to be the paramount consideration, accompanied by detailed mechanisms 
to incorporate children’s views. As the court continuously underlines that welfare must be 
determined in light of each child’s circumstances and the facts of the case (Morrison et al., 2013), 
there is potential for children’s views to be part of such determinations. Given this framework, how 
well are courts ensuring that children’s participation rights are being met? 
Dominant narratives of children’s participation in Scottish family law 
A positive story can be told about Scottish family law proceedings. A pivotal case, Shields v Shields 
(2002 SC 246) led to considerably more judicial discussion of children’s participation (for details and 
analysis of this particular case, see Barnes, 2008; Tisdall and Morrison, 2012). A review of reported 
case law prior to 2001 found rare examples where children’s views were discussed (so children’s 
participation may have been exemplary or not, but it was not part of written reasoning) (Marshall at 
al., 2002); the updated review in 2010 found a greater number of reported cases expressly 
referencing S.11(7)(b) and discussing children’s views as part of the decision-making (Tisdall and 
Morrison, 2012). Children as young as age 3 have had their views duly considered (see Stewart v 
Stewart 2007 CSIH 20; Mackay, 2013a). This interest in children’s participation, in reported case law 
and recent empirical studies, provides a basis to consider the dominant narratives of children’s 
participation in Scottish family law and how these facilitate or block children’s participation rights.  
Dominant narratives 1 and 2: Institutionalised, formal and ‘events-based’ 
Children’s participation in Scottish family law can be characterised as institutionalised, formal and 
‘events-based’. These characteristics give a place and a protection for children’s participation, within 
a largely adult-focused system (Neale, 2002; Tisdall et al., 2002).  
The introduction of S.11(7)(b) through the 1995 Act was intended to institutionalise and formalise 
children’s rights to participate, bolstered by subsequent secondary legislation and rules of court 
(Scottish Law Commission, 1992). Because of this legal basis, breaching children’s rights to 
participate has been grounds for appeal, and successful appeals at that. One such appeal was Shields 
                                                          
4 Due to the Advice and Assistance (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2010 and the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) 
Amendment Regulations 2010. 
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v Shields, cited above. This was a relocation case, with the mother requesting a residence and 
specific issue order, in regards to her son who was seven and a half years old. The case was appealed 
to the Sheriff Principal, who noted negatively that attention had been lacking in ensuring the child 
had an opportunity to state his views. Papers had not been served on the child and hence the child 
had not received the Form F9; no justification for this had been recorded, beyond the child’s age. 
The Sheriff Principal still refused the appeal, as he would ‘have to be satisfied that no Sheriff acting 
reasonably in the circumstances … could have refrained from seeking the views of an 8-year old 
child’ (4). The Inner House of Court of Session disagreed. The child had an absolute right to 
discretion and a hypothetical situation could not be referred to. Further, courts could not necessarily 
rest on an early decision but had to consider whether a material change in circumstances had 
happened, up until the order was made. The lapse of time between intimation being dispensed with, 
and the decision being taken, was such a material change.5 The Court of Session’s subsequent 
observations help clarify the participation provisions of the 1995 Act. The first test is ‘practicability’, 
which is a low threshold: ‘But, if, by one method or another, it is “practicable” to give a child the 
opportunity of expressing his views, then, in our view the only safe course is to employ that method’ 
(11).  Thus, the issue becomes largely how rather than whether a child’s views should be ascertained. 
Only after a child’s views has been sought does the court decide on the weight to be given to the 
child’s views, in making its decision. Shields v Shields thus should have bolstered children’s views 
being elicited for disputed court proceedings, with the responsibility on adults to have the skills to 
do so.  
However, recent reported cases and empirical evidence suggests some counter-trends. Increasingly, 
children’s opportunities are being subsumed by concerns that courts are not good places for 
children to participate directly. Courts are considered too institutionalised and too formal for 
children – and thus courts decide that it is against a child’s welfare to be involved.   
From the start, children may not be given the opportunity to state their views to the court because 
of (adult) concerns about their welfare. In Mackay’s research (2013a and b), only 17% (52 of 299 
children) were sent the Form F9 and only 25 returned them, with an additional 9 children sending a 
letter to the court instead. Mackay (2013b) explains that most solicitors acting for the parents asked 
the court to dispense with sending the form, citing the ‘tender years of the child’. This reason was 
used even for children aged 12 years or over, despite the legal presumption in S.11(10). Intimation 
to the child was often dispensed with because of: the weaknesses of the Form F9 (as it was not 
                                                          
5 Although note that a gap of 16 months was not considered material in C v M 2005 Fam LR 36 and in S v A 
2015 WL 1839055 any material change of circumstance could be addressed by a party using a minute to vary 
(para 19). 
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particularly child-friendly, it was unclear on its confidentiality, and it could be influenced by others) 
and practitioners incorrectly thinking that intimation would include the Initial Writ (which can 
include negative allegations). Writing about English procedures, Mantle and colleagues (2006) found 
that early decisions on children’s involvement were difficult to revise and thus difficult to alter. Such 
decisions, analysed Mantle and colleagues, were based on age-based views of competence. In the 
Scottish situation, the decisions seem based on age-based views of children’s welfare.  
Until recently, children’s direct involvement in court proceedings has not been encouraged by the 
courts nor prevalent in practice. O’Malley v O’Malley (2004 Fam LR 44) asserted judicial discretion 
on the mode of children’s participation, while in X v Y (2007 Fam LR 153) the sheriff refused a party’s 
request to see the children himself, as he was ‘not the appropriate person’ (154).6 In Mackay’s 
research, only 3 children out of 299 children spoke to the sheriff directly. There is thus not a 
substantial tradition of direct engagement between judges and children, whether to familiarise 
children with how court decisions are made, to let them know who is making the court decision, or 
to provide children with the opportunity to express their views. Some recent reported cases may 
show a changing trend, at least amongst some in the judiciary. The judge shows a proactive 
approach, in G v G (2014 WL 2194580), taking the opportunity of interviewing the child (28). His 
judgement provides a detailed description on the interview method, its quality and what the child 
said. However, in developing the argument for the decision, there is no reference to the child’s views 
being influential on the decision. In another appeal case, S v A (2015 WL 1839055), the sheriff’s 
attempt to interview child A is commended, even though the child was not ‘keen to engage in 
discussion’ with the sheriff (8). Given the increased enthusiasm for judicial interviews in England and 
elsewhere (Bala, Birnbaum, and Cyr, 2015; Cobb, 2015), practice may be rapidly changing amongst 
some of the judiciary but is only seen in certain reported case law to date.  
The case Hall v Hall (2014 WL 4063101) suggests having a self-represented litigant may weigh 
against children’s direct participation. The sheriff in Hall v Hall is very negative about how the 
appellant conducted his case, generally. Further, the sheriff is critical that the appellant had brought 
one of his children, Z, to court even though Z was not party to the proceedings:  
Indeed, on an earlier occasion a different sheriff entered the court room for a continued 
child welfare hearing only to find Z sitting in court. The sheriff correctly decided that Z be 
removed from the court and arrangements were made for him to be looked after during 
the hearing. This is a very clear example of the appellant’s lack of judgement in 
                                                          
6 To be more specific, the Sheriff wrote that he was not the appropriate person to determine if the children 
had lied to the consultant psychologist. The Sheriff did have a general conversation with the children as they 
had arrived at court expecting to see him. 
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considering the welfare of one of his children, rather than asserting at whatever cost his 
deeply held principles about the appropriate legal basis for his children’s care 
arrangements. (13(2))  
In Hall v Hall, the children were seen as overly involved, in the proceedings, by their father (see 
below). Much has been written about the potential pressures of increased self-representation in 
England. These include greater judicial management (whether to protect or constrain the self-
represented litigant) and extended proceedings due to party litigants’ lack of legal awareness and 
negotiation (see Bevan, 2013; Hunt, 2011). Children can also be negatively impacted by such 
pressures, whether or not they are themselves party to the proceedings. This has led English family 
law discussions to encourage greater protections of vulnerable witnesses, including proactive 
consideration by the court (Vulnerable Witnesses and Children Working Group, 2015). In Scotland, 
the response seems primarily to exclude children’s direct participation in courts.  
While some early cases successfully tested children’s ability to gain legal representation (Henderson 
v Henderson 1997 Fam LR 120), there also have been decisions where courts resisted children being 
separately represented. For example, in B v B (2011 SLT (Sh Ct) 225) a court refused to allow a child 
to have her own legal representation, even though the child did not agree with the view presented 
by the curator ad litem and wished to have her own solicitor. Changes in legal aid mean that children 
are even less likely to have a solicitor’s support for participation. Previously a child would be 
assessed financially in the same way as an adult, on the basis of the child’s own disposable income 
and capital. Since changes in 2011, a solicitor assessing a child who applies for civil legal assistance 
must take account of the financial circumstances of anyone who owes a duty of ailment to that child. 
There is an exemption – if it would be unjust or inequitable to do so, in the particular circumstances 
of the case. Statistics are limited, but what is known is that there has been a drop in civil advice and 
assistance intimations from children under age 16, since these legal aid changes.7 Children are even 
less likely than before to have their own legal representation.  
As court practices are creating more and more barriers for children to be involved in the formal 
events of courts, children face a double layer of interpretation of their views (see also Trinder, Jenks 
and Firth, 2010). If children are given the opportunity to express their views, this is usually done 
through a report ordered by the court. In Mackay’s study, for example, only 42% (125 of 299) of 
children had their views taken into account by one or more of the mechanisms listed above; the 
                                                          
7 Statistics are available from a freedom of information request to the Scottish Legal Aid Board (see 
http://www.clanchildlaw.org/app/uploads/2014/11/Legal-Assistance-for-Children-and-Young-People.pdf). This 
found a drop in civil advice and assistance intimations, from 1852 for children under age 16 in April 
2009/March 2010 to 898 in April 2011/March 2012.  
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most commonly used was reports (68 children by court reports and a further 15 children by a 
curator ad litem).  A court reporter will be instructed on what to report upon by the court, which can 
include a request to ascertain children’s views; a curator ad litem is appointed to protect the child’s 
interests. Neither role has a responsibility to advocate for the child or to support the child in stating 
her views, directly to the court. 
The role, support and procedures for court reporters and curators ad litem have been thoroughly 
and officially criticised, from the Scottish Government report finding variable practice (Whitecross, 
2011) to the Scottish Civil Courts Review (Scottish Courts and Tribunals, 2009).8 Direct research with 
children also suggests concern. Morrison (2014) reports questionable practice, such as children 
being asked by court reporters directly and in front of a parent ‘don’t you love him?’ to court 
reporters intervening to force children to have contact with a parent. Morrison, as well as other 
research (Fortin, 2007; Mantle et al., 2007), finds that trust is essential for children and young 
people to express their views, and that building trust takes particular skills from adults – and time. 
The constrained funding for such reports, and the ensuing practices, can find children having a single 
meeting with a reporter and not feeling that they can adequately express their views. Thus this 
process risks being ‘event-based’ itself, a snapshot of children’s stated views at any one time rather 
than views developed over time, in context, and supported by information. 
In Morrison’s research, some children were concerned that their direct views had not been 
expressed to the sheriff, by the professionals. This raises a distinction made in English research, 
about whether such professionals should directly present children’s views – a form of transmission – 
or should they interpret or translate children’s views, in light of their overall role to protect the 
child’s interests (Office of Children’s Commissioner, 2011). But courts may well not be making this 
distinction, accepting reports as the transmitted views of the children rather than recognising them 
as interpretations or translations. For example, in L v L (2013 WL 3994808), the sheriff observes that 
the judge is ‘entitled to treat the recorded views as the views of the child unless the judge 
(exceptionally) accepts evidence that contradicts them’ (22). A high reliance can be given to such 
reports, which may not fully or partially relay children’s views.  Further, even a transmission of 
children’s views is a form of interpretation (unless the full audio and visual version of children’s 
views is provided), as it involves selection and contextual framing. Reports will always be one layer 
of interpreting children’s views, following by the second layer when courts in turn interpret the 
reports.  
                                                          
8 With new guidance imminently to be published, to improve practice.  
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A 2012 Supreme Court decision9 may have further curtailed children’s opportunities to express their 
views. In B v G (2012 UKSC 21), the court was scathing about the unnecessarily lengthy contact 
proceedings, with accompanying costs, which were ‘inimical to the best interests of the child’ (21). 
Already this has led to new procedural rules and encouragement of active judicial case management. 
But rather than recognising children’s views may change over time, as in Shields v Shields, courts’ 
attention has been drawn to the distress of repeatedly involving children and how this is against the 
children’s best interests. For example, the Sheriff Principal in Hall v Hall refers to B v G and then later 
writes: ‘… it is clear from the history of the proceedings that the views of the children have been 
sought on many occasions, arguably too often’ (13(6)) and that repeated questions by the appellant 
has put ‘each of his children under enormous pressure’ (13(6), referring to the sheriff’s words). More 
generally, the Sheriff Principal observes that this case is typical of ones where ‘children are left to 
suffer the consequences, not least because their opinions on what they want are asked often and in 
circumstances where they could never be expected to cope’ (8). Thus, involvement in the 
proceedings themselves is seen as potentially harmful to children, in creating pressure and/or 
distress. This is not to negate that proceedings may well cause additional pressure on and distress 
for children. However, Hall v Hall does not ask whether there had been a ‘material change in 
circumstances’ for the child, due to the substantial period of time, following Shields v Shields. 
Instead, the concern is about the potential pressure and distress to the child, following the Supreme 
Court decision on B v G.  
Morrison (2014) and other researchers on domestic abuse criticise the ‘events-based’ understanding 
of domestic abuse, which does not match many women’s or children’s accounts about domestic 
abuse as on-going (see Coy, Scott, Tweedale and Perks, 2015). It does not capture the cumulative 
effects of domestic abuse on a child’s wellbeing and ongoing fear, even if the violence has 
apparently ended. Morrison (2014) found children needing to manage communication between 
parents, when one or both were seeking to avoid communicating in the context of domestic abuse. 
She found children had different and changing views about contact with their fathers: some were 
positive, some conditional, and others negative. In-depth knowledge of the particular context, 
experiences and feelings of the children and mother were necessary to understand the stated views 
of the children towards contact with their fathers. Yet court mechanisms did not seem able to gain 
this fuller understanding (Morrison et al., 2013). Current discussions (Scottish Government, 2015) of 
alternative definitions of domestic abuse – particularly coercive control – may better capture 
                                                          
9 See also S v S (2012 Fam LR 32). 
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children and their mothers’ experiences of domestic abuse and assist courts in making decisions 
when such coercive control is present.  
Institutionalising and formalising children’s participation in Scottish legislation and court procedures 
have provided some protection and support to children’s rights to participate. But concerns about 
children’s welfare can trump children’s participation rights, as seen by concerns about children’s 
‘tender years’ and receiving inappropriate information during intimation, to concerns about their 
involvement if proceedings are too long or if self-represented litigants are acting inappropriately. 
Restrictions in legal aid has limited children’s information about and access more directly to 
proceedings, making children’s participation even more reliant on court reports and curators ad 
litem. Because of constraints on funding and time, these reports themselves risk being event-based, 
seeking a potentially uninformed and unsupported ‘snapshot’ view of children over one or two 
meetings. This does not tap into children’s everyday experiences and participation, including in the 
contexts of domestic abuse; it does not facilitate their participation being embedded or routine in 
the processes nor decisions.  
Dominant narratives 3 to 5: Outcomes-oriented, discursive and individualistic 
In Scottish family law, children’s participation can also be characterised as being largely outcomes-
oriented, discursive and individualistic. Case law (e.g. M v M 2012 SLT 428) repeatedly underlines 
that the court’s paramount consideration is the child’s welfare, when deciding whether or not to 
make a S.11 order and if so what order to make. This is the outcome that must be sought. Children’s 
participation is instrumental to the court’s decision on children’s welfare: children’s views are given 
weight if they are perceived to help the court in that decision (e.g. R v R 2012 WL 5894486).  
Courts value reports that assist them in making their welfare decision, considering the particular 
facts and circumstances of the case. For example, reported case law shows how courts value reports 
that are ‘balanced’. In J v J (2004 Fam LR 20), the court criticised the expert report for not being 
balanced. The expert was instructed only by the mother, he had only interviewed her and only met 
with the children in the mother’s home. Thus the report was seen as having insufficient knowledge 
and not considering all the factors a court must take into account. Children’s views are more likely to 
be influential on the courts if contained within reports that treat welfare as the paramount 
consideration, consider the range of relevant evidence, and provide expert guidance on what weight 
should be given to children’s views (see Ellis v Ellis 2003 Fam LR 77 and CAM v HM 2012 WL 
3062491). 
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Eaton (2015) points out that, in English law, wishes and feelings need not be verbalised nor written 
down.10 In Scottish procedures, the mechanisms privilege a view being expressed discursively, in 
words, whether written down or verbal. Thus children could write down their views, in the Form F9; 
they could meet with the judge and state their views directly; most often their views are said to a 
court reporter or curator ad litem, who then write about these views in their reports. If children 
express views in different ways – e.g. through behaviour – then this is more likely to be categorised 
as information about their best interests. It thus may have considerable weight but it will not be 
considered as their views.  
This focus on the ‘voice’ of the child has its merits: other forms of expression have particular risks of 
discretionary interpretation, such as how to interpret behaviour or an art drawing (Einarsdóttir, 
Dockett and Perry, 2009). However, reifying the ‘voice’ of the child creates a misplaced ‘quest for 
access to children’s “true” or authentic wishes and feelings’ (Hunter, 2007, p. 283). The quest 
becomes one for a definitive, discursive statement of the child’s views, which is then recorded and 
given due weight in decision-making. Scottish courts place more weight on children’s views if the 
stated views are characterised as consistent, definite and clear (e.g. R v R 2012). If the views are 
described as ambivalent or the child as anxious, then the court gives the views less weight in making 
its decisions (see Tisdall and Morrison, 2012, also P v M 2012 GWD 26-549). Courts seem to want 
views that are fixed and unemotional.  
But courts are making decisions on issues that are highly likely to be distressing to children and their 
families. Research in the UK and elsewhere shows that parental separation and subsequent changes 
are distressing to many children, as well as for many parents (Bailey, Thoburn and Timms, 2011; 
Fortin, Hunt and Scanlan, 2012). Research shows that most children (but not all) do not want to 
‘choose’ between their parents (see Parkinson and Cashmore, 2008). Research does find that most 
children want to contribute their views and for their views to be considered in decision making 
(Birnbaum and Saini, 2012). Yet Fortin and colleagues’ retrospective study with young adults found 
that many had not been involved in decisions: 
Although some separating parents involve their children in discussion over their future 
upbringing, respondents’ accounts suggest that surprisingly large numbers seemed 
unaware of their children’s new found independence, and assumed that they would fall 
in with whatever arrangements were put in place for their future upbringing. (p. 4)   
Further, Fortin and colleagues found that young people who were involved in making decisions 
about contact subsequently are more likely to have positive experiences of contact.  The English and 
                                                          
10 See also Cobb, 2015.  
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Welsh Voice of the Child Dispute Resolution Advisory Group makes a strong claim that distress 
should not be a reason to exclude children from processes:  
Arguments that it might be distressing to the child do not normally constitute good 
reason to disenfranchise the child … Furthermore, high conflict disputes can be 
particularly stressful for children and being able to express their concerns and worries 
can be reassuring and supportive. (2015: 133)  
The advisory group are working on child dispute resolution, outwith courts, but their view is 
provocative to consider for court procedures as well (see also Vulnerable Witnesses and Children 
Working Group, 2015). The question moves away from excluding children because they are 
distressed, to how to include them positively.  
Courts find it difficult to deal with views that are not considered autonomous. As Barnes (2008) 
writes, if children’s views are characterised as ‘manipulated’ by parents or others, the views are 
given little weight. Such concerns can be tracked through reported case law, with court decisions 
mentioning children being pressured by parents being present during interviews or giving material 
bribes (e.g. Ellis v Ellis and C v M 2012 GWD 9-170) or counter-assertions, where a child answers 
questions ‘without any sign of being coached and with no detectable bias in favour of either parent’ 
(G v G 2014 WL 2194580, 28) or that a child ‘knew her own mind’ (H v H 2010 SLT 395, 31; see also V 
v Locality Reporter Manager, Stirling 2013 Fam LR 69, 8). More overt concern may be increasing in 
reported case law, as more strongly worded phrasing can be found in Hall v Hall (see above) and E v 
W 2014 WL 4063090.11 Here the sheriff writes:  
I do not believe a 7 year old child would talk in the manner they claim. I am of the opinion 
they were, so to speak, putting their own concerns into his mouth … That seems to me to 
be the ways adults, not young children speak. (11) 
Thus, children’s views were undermined because the sheriff perceived the child as speaking like 
adults. In E v W, the sheriff may well be right about parental coercion. But the particular phrasing 
resonates with how children’s views are undermined, in other participation activities, where children 
are described as too ‘professionalised’ and too proficient in knowing the adult discourses (Faulkner, 
2009). Thus as children become more informed and experienced in expressing their views, this risks 
their views being given less weight because they are not considered ‘authentic’.  
                                                          
11 This case was about contempt of court because the mother had not fulfilled the requirements of contact 
established by a previous order.  
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Concerns about ‘manipulation’ are given extra salience because of the substantial proportion of 
cases reaching court, which likely involve domestic abuse (Trinder, Connolly, Kellett, Notley and 
Swift, 2006).12 This raises particular difficulties for the judiciary, as so much domestic abuse remains 
underreported to the police, so few allegations in family law cases have been tested by courts 
(Morrison et al., 2013). There is no single definition of ‘domestic abuse’ in Scottish policy generally 
nor in the legislative provisions in particular. While courts must now take account of ‘abuse’ when 
taking the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration, courts have found the definition unclear 
and circuitous (s.11(7C), see R v R 2010 Fam LR 123). The legislative definition is criticised for 
potentially making disputes more contentious because of the ‘emotive connotations’ of using the 
term abuse (Morrison et al., 2013). Indeed, this amended section is rarely cited in reported case law, 
in comparison to the estimates of domestic abuse in contested cases.13  
In summary, both empirical evidence and reviews of reported case law suggest difficulties for courts 
in dealing with children’s views, if children are considered to be emotional, inconsistent or 
manipulated. Courts can have particular difficulties in dealing with disputed parental responsibilities 
cases, when there are allegations or suspicions of domestic abuse. Children may well be pressured 
and manipulated in such cases but also, as so little domestic abuse is proven legally, may have their 
concerns under-recognised. Because the court’s paramount consideration is the child’s welfare, 
children’s views are largely helpful if they assist with that outcome. If the views are not considered 
rational, consistent and the children’s own, then the court considers them less helpful in its decision-
making. Yet this misses that – particularly in the context of parental separation – children and others 
are likely to be distressed and emotional, changing their ideas, and embedded in relationships.  
Conclusion  
Threading through the above discussion are the balances courts and others are seeking to make, 
between children’s welfare and children’s views. Such balances are well rehearsed in literature and a 
dilemma for policy and practice in many jurisdictions (e.g. see Douglas, 2013; Trinder, Jenks and 
Firth, 2010). The primacy or paramountcy of children’s best interests or welfare has been a 
longstanding principle in many jurisdictions, when administrative or legal systems are making 
decisions about children and their families (see Freeman, 2012). The recognition that children’s 
views should be given due consideration in such decision-making is more recent, encouraged by 
Article 12 in the CRC, with steady growth in legislation, policy and practice (see Percy-Smith and 
                                                          
12 In England, 41.9% of resident parents involved in in-court conciliation attributed ‘domestic violence’ or 
‘emotional abuse’ as the reason for separation. More than half of the resident parents reported fear of 
violence made it difficult to resolve problems associated with contact. 
13 Exceptions include AS v AB 2010 G.W.D. 32-663 and JB v AG 2013 GWD 3-96. 
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Thomas, 2010). Literature documents how adults’ discretion to determine children’s best interests 
or welfare can exclude children’s views (see FRA, 2015). It also documents that, while Article 12 was 
arguably innovative in establishing children’s rights to participation, it also involves decisions about 
children’s capacity and maturity. Thus children’s welfare and children’s views involve discretionary 
decisions, exercised largely by adults.   
With children’s welfare as the paramount consideration of Scottish courts, in regards to S.11 orders 
on parental responsibilities and rights, the balance tips towards children’s welfare away from 
children’s views. Courts are not seen as a good place for children to participate, because of concerns 
about children’s welfare. The initial processes around intimation and the Form F9 are seen as 
detrimental to most children’s welfare – so children are seldom included at this early stage. Direct 
involvement in court proceedings has not been encouraged by the courts nor prevalent in practice. 
Age can be used easily as a reason to not involve children and often as a shorthand to protect them 
(the ‘tender years’). Courts’ concerns about children’s distress, and children being distressed by 
courts, lead courts to order reports to obtain children’s views. Such reports are most valued by 
courts when they support the courts’ own decision-making – which circles back to children’s welfare. 
Children’s views then are helpful if they assist the court in determining children’s welfare. This 
instrumental status contributes to courts valuing children’s views if the views are perceived as 
rational, consistent, and their own – rather than emotional, changing or manipulated. Thus, 
following Hunter’s quotation at the start of this article, Scottish legislation and procedures have the 
potential to be framed by the new paradigms of children’s rights, children as social actors and young 
citizens. But the welfare paradigm still seems dominant, with welfare concerns used to exclude 
children’s participation so they are not treated as ‘subjects with agency’.  
Recent writings in childhood studies are asserting that it is unhelpful to perceive agency as an 
essential identity, position or characteristic. Agency is more usefully perceived as relational and 
contextual. Contexts influence whether children express ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ agency: 
… ‘thin’ agency refers to decisions and everyday actions that are carried out within highly 
restrictive contexts, characterized by few viable alternatives. ‘Thick’ agency is having the 
latitude to act within a broad range of options. It is possible for a person’s agency to be 
‘thickened’ or ‘thinned’ over time and space, and across their various relationships … 
Structures, contexts, and relationships can act as ‘thinners’ or ‘thickners’ of individuals’ 
agency by constraining or expanding their range of viable choices. (Klocker, 2007, p. 85) 
Thus, many children affected by domestic abuse may have particularly ‘thin’ agency in disputed 
contact cases but this could be ‘thickened’ with sufficient support for their views to be developed, 
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heard and understood. Time constraints can thin children’s agency, as concerns about undue delays 
and over-consulting can squeeze out children’s participation opportunities. The limited time given 
for court reports in turn creates limited opportunities for children to gain the information and 
establish sufficient trust to express their views. The article above documents numerous ways that 
current family law practices thin children’s agency.  
Wyness’ dominant narratives fit well onto Scottish family law proceedings. For cases that reach 
courts, participation becomes formalised in court procedures. ‘Taking account’ of a child’s views is 
treated as an event, whether after one or two visits by the court reporter to the child or a child 
submitting views on a Form F9. The court wants to keep it as an event, rather than having on-going 
and potentially distressing rehearsing of a child’s views. Participation is outcomes-oriented, in that it 
is contributes to decisions about a child’s welfare. There is a concentration on what a child says or 
what is written down. The focus is on the individual child, with particular attention to age so as to 
protect a child and determine the child’s competency.  
Wyness’ alternative narratives suggest different understandings of children’s participation in family 
law decisions. The focus on obtaining the child’s views, writing them down and then treating them 
as ‘set’ may be convenient for the court but does not reflect how a child’s views are contextual, 
relational and potentially changing. Recognising that participation is emotional, contextual and 
embedded requires a more subtle understandings of ‘manipulation’, recognising the significant 
proportion of cases reaching courts involving coercive control/ domestic abuse. It might take into 
account suggestions by Mantle and colleagues (2007) about how to help support children to express 
their views, including working with parents, having sufficient time to establish trust and rapport, 
checking out understandings across a number of contacts, and using a variety of expressive modes 
including drawing to be able to elicit different understandings. Much ore use could be made of video 
recordings and video links, to capture fuller information of children’s embodied and communicated 
views. Acceptance of such alternative narratives would encourage courts and personnel not to veer 
away from perceived or actual distress of a child (see Pinkney, 2014). Proceedings should be adapted 
to best support children, to minimise their distress. But adult fears of emotionality should not 
disenfranchise a child.  
A distinction has emerged within the literature on dispute resolution, between approaches that are 
‘child-focused’ and those that are ‘child-inclusive’ (Ewing, Hunter, Barlow and Smithson, 2015). A 
child-focused approach seeks to ‘put the child at the centre’, the focus of proceedings and decisions, 
and thus protects a child’s welfare. This would seem to match the intentions and decision-making of 
Scottish family law proceedings. The child is the focus, with the paramount consideration being the 
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child’s welfare. But the child-focused approach contrasts with a ‘child-inclusive’ approach, which 
facilitates a child’s active involvement in the process alongside attention to a child’s welfare. As 
being developed in other jurisdictions, this requires more radical change to adult processes and 
procedures. And to be child-inclusive is to bring in the realities of children’s participation. Children 
can be constructed productively as social actors and as rights holders, but respecting that requires 
understanding that agency is relational and contextual, expressions of it requires trust and 
information, and may be emotional as well as rational and change over time.  Adults need to change 
their narratives of participation, as well as improving how courts and family law more generally can 
sensitively involve children in decisions that affect them.  
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